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SYMPOSIUM on Regional Authority and the Postfunctionalist Theory of 
Governance 
 
 
Abstract 
This symposium engages two recent books on regional governance. The first sets out a measure 
of regional authority for 81 countries in North America, Europe, Latin America, Asia and the 
Pacific from 1950 to 2010. The second theorizes how regional governance is shaped by 
functional and communal pressures. These pressures are detected in many historical episodes 
of jurisdictional reform. These books seek to pin them down empirically. Community and 
efficiency appear to have tangible and contrasting effects that explain how jurisdictions are 
designed, why regional governance has become differentiated, and how multilevel governance 
has deepened over the past several decades. 
The symposium consists of contributions by Kent Eaton, Jean-Paul Faguet, and Imke Harbers 
followed by a response from the authors.  
 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sandra Chapman 
Osterkatz, and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist 
Theory of Governance. Volume I, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 687pp.  
 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, (with Arjan H. Schakel, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sandra 
Chapman Osterkatz, and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield). Community, Scale, and Regional 
Governance: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume II. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016. 195pp.  
 
KEYWORDS: governance, multilevel governance, regions, Europe, Asia, Latin America, scale, 
territorial 
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Regional Authority and the Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance 
 
Kent Eaton 
 
 
 
 
A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance succeeds at more than one scale, to use a word that 
matters much to the two scholars, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, who have brought to 
fruition this remarkable, multi-volume, collaborative project. At the heart of volumes 1 and 2 is 
a sustained and disciplined focus on subnational regions, whose governments operate between 
the national and local levels, and whose significance has often gone unappreciated and 
unexamined in the comparative politics subfield of political science. Hooghe and Marks have 
made path-breaking contributions – conceptual, empirical, and theoretical – to our 
understanding of the increasing salience of subnational regions as spaces of governance. 
Conceptually, one of the distinctive strengths of these first two volumes is the decision 
to focus on the authority of regions as the central concept of concern. Among other things, this 
conceptual move enables Hooghe and Marks to help bridge the literatures on decentralization 
and federalism, which have tended to use different conceptual vocabularies and to talk past 
one another to a surprising degree given their shared interest in subnational governance. 
Whereas students of federalism have focused on the constitutional constraints and 
opportunities within which subnational governments operate, and students of decentralization 
have focused on the processes through which these governments are empowered, both can be 
said to be fundamentally interested in the authority of regional governments, which Hooghe 
and Marks insist is the key concept we should be privileging. In this sense, the authors have 
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given us a common vocabulary that could lead to greater mutual intelligibility across the 
burgeoning scholarship on territorial politics and multi-level governance.  
Having selected regional authority as their core concept, Hooghe and Marks then 
disaggregate authority into its two main components of self-rule and shared rule, both of which 
are further disaggregated into five dimensions each, for a total of 10 dimensions along which 
regional authority can vary across time and space. While the authors note that “these 
dimensions are quite strongly associated with each other and can be thought of as indicators of 
a latent variable (vol. 1, p. 15),” the clarity of the disaggregation also means that others who are 
so inclined can use the Regional Authority Index to theorize about different combinations of 
particular subsets of these 10 dimensions (and generate theories that might actually look 
different from the theory of “community and scale” that the authors derive from the data). This 
is the mark of a highly generative, and generous, project. 
Beyond the rigor of the conceptualization and the transparency of the measurement 
guidelines, what is likely to most impress many readers is the herculean nature of the empirical 
effort through which regional authority is then scored for 81 countries across Asia, Europe, and 
the Americas, often for a period of up to 60 years (1950-2010). The only way to pull off a coding 
exercise of such daunting scope is to assemble a team of researchers to conduct the requisite 
country profiles, constituted in this case by Arjan Schakel, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sandra Chapman 
Osterkatz, and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield. Trained in the same measurement techniques, the 
research team is particularly careful to anchor their coding decisions in an array of secondary 
sources, which are much more readily available for some cases (Brazil, Canada Russia) than 
others (Belize, Brunei, Bulgaria). The end result is not just a stunning 1.7 million region/year 
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observations, but a text that is able to use illustrative examples from an unusually disparate set 
of country cases (drawn from five continents!) to render concrete the various analytical points 
the authors wish to make. Derived from such a large dataset, the empirical findings become 
that much more arresting – and the volumes are loaded with them. For instance, sifting 
through the data, the authors find that, once granted and/or increased by the center, regional 
authority almost never decreases except in the context of regime change, that is, unless the 
national regime type changes from democratic to authoritarian. According to another intriguing 
pattern, the authors find that the asymmetric treatment of subnational regions (what they call 
“differentiated governance”) is much less stable than the granting of autonomy to all 
subnational regions on a symmetric basis. Or, to name a third pattern, when national 
governments institute “differentiated governance,” they are far more likely to introduce 
changes that empower rather than disempower specific regions with special forms of authority.  
Just as significant as these conceptual and empirical contributions is the compelling 
theoretical framework that Hooghe and Marks elaborate to help explain the patterns of 
regional authority they’ve documented around the world. Not many political scientists these 
days are offering wholesale theories of governance, and the challenge of course is to articulate 
a theory that can literally travel the globe without becoming so esoteric or abstract or trivial 
that it loses its ability to offer substantive and meaningful insights in highly disparate settings. 
Considering these constraints, I’m struck by the usefulness of the authors’ main theoretical 
claim that regional authority can everywhere be understood as the result of deep struggles 
between rival advocates of “community” and “scale,” alternately conceptualized as “sociality” 
and “efficiency.”  
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Reflecting the “postfunctionalist” adjective they assign to their theory, Hooghe and 
Marks offer a powerful challenge to the overly technocratic and insufficiently political 
approaches that have characterized both the study of regional governance in the public 
administration literature and the kind of programming that has been adopted in this area on 
the part of multilateral and bilateral development practitioners. The historical record tells us 
that diverse communities have shaped the territorial distribution of authority “from the ground 
up,” resulting in highly diverse designs that typically upset the homogenizing impulses of the 
center. As Hooghe and Marks remind us, “territorial community is perhaps the strongest form 
of solidarity there is (vol. 2, p. 3).”  In this sense, the authors provide a damning account of 
purely functionalist or efficiency-based approaches to this topic; anyone with a technocratic 
mindset couldn’t read these volumes and not walk away with a profound sense of what they 
are missing by focusing only on the efficiency imperatives of “scale.” And yet, to their credit, 
Hooghe and Marks craft a theoretical framework that still maintains a central role for 
considerations of “scale,” and for those actors (from Napoleon to Pinochet) who have forcefully 
imprinted efficiency goals on the design of regional governance. Taken together, what’s 
impressive is how much the rival pressures created by “community and scale” can help account 
for so much of the messy politics surrounding territory that we see in the world today. To my 
mind, the theory of “community and scale” strikes a balance that is difficult to achieve, 
providing a quite elegant and yet very rich way to think about territorial governance. 
In addition to these impressive conceptual, empirical, and theoretical contributions, I’d 
also like to emphasize what is perhaps most unique about this multi-volume project, which 
derives from the authors’ focus on the design of jurisdictions and what they call the Who 
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Question. It is not much of an overstatement to say that virtually all of American political 
science focuses on the question of how and why decisions are made within existing 
jurisdictions, often without problematizing the size or boundaries or existence of those 
jurisdictions. Even when political scientists take up topics that touch directly on jurisdictional 
matters, such as state-building and transnational integration, the priority is not to question 
existing jurisdictional boundaries, focusing in the former case on how capacity accrues within 
existing states, and in the latter case on how societal and economic actors interact across 
existing state boundaries. Asking the Who Question has of course been central to the robust 
literature on nationalism, but within political science this fundamental question has mostly 
been confined to that field of study. 
Commensurate with the ambition and scope of what Hooghe and Marks set out to do in 
these two volumes, they will be certain to trigger a lively debate at each of the levels flagged 
above – conceptual, empirical, and theoretical. As a contribution to that debate, I wish to 
identify three questions that arose from my reading of this Postfunctionalist Theory of 
Governance. The first has to do with authority, which Hooghe and Marks have for good reason 
chosen as the core concept in their work. One likely critique here would be that the focus on 
formal as opposed to informal authority is limiting, particularly in the case of less 
institutionalized polities that lack a robust tradition of the rule of law.  While we might imagine 
that formal levels of authority map quite well onto the authority that regions actually wield vis-
à-vis the center in places like France or Germany, this becomes more questionable in contexts 
where powerful national governments run roughshod over formal constraints, and where 
judiciaries are not strong or independent enough to prevent such behavior in defense of 
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regional governments. If this is an obvious critique, then the obvious response is that including 
informal authority would necessarily sacrifice the transparency of measurement that makes this 
project so distinctive, and in turn would dramatically reduce the range of countries included in 
the dataset.  
Another line of thought has to do not with the difference between formal and informal 
authority, but with the difference between authority and capacity. In the Postfunctionalist 
Theory of Governance, one could argue that authority and capacity are somewhat conflated to 
the extent that authority is defined as the “capacity to make legitimate and binding decisions 
for a collectivity (vol. 2, p. 29).”  Thus capacity is subsumed within the definition of authority 
rather than treated as a term to be separately conceptualized and assessed. Understanding the 
relationship between authority and capacity is a tricky business; according to Rebecca Abers 
and Margaret Keck (2013), authority and capacity cannot be easily or even profitably 
disentangled, and should instead be understood to mutually constitute each other. A distinct 
approach, however, is to insist on the conceptual difference between formal grants of authority 
to make binding decisions, on the one hand, and the administrative/institutional/state capacity 
necessary to actually implement those decisions, on the other. In recent years, comparative 
politics has witnessed renewed and intense interest in the conceptualization, 
operationalization, and measurement of state capacity. Though much of this new literature 
focuses on the national rather than subnational level (Kurtz 2013, Saylor 2014, Soifer 2015), 
others seek to understand the sources and implications of uneven capacity at the subnational 
level. For example, Prerna Singh (2015) argues that strong subnational identities, or what she 
calls subnationalism, have led to higher levels of subnational capacity in some Indian states 
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than in others. Imke Harbers (2014) shows that variation in state capacity across subnational 
governments can help us understand territorial patterns of citizen satisfaction with public 
services. Daniel Ziblatt (2006) demonstrates that higher levels of subnational capacity, or what 
he calls infrastructural power, can help explain why countries (like Germany) opted for 
federalism over unitarism. In his account, it is the existence of capacity that holds the keys for 
understanding struggles over the territorial distribution of authority. In my own work on Latin 
America (Eaton 2017), I argue that subnational capacity matters more than authority in 
explaining why and when subnational governments are able to deviate from the ideological 
orientation of the national government; provided they have the requisite capacity, subnational 
governments, surprisingly, can meaningfully challenge the center even if they do not have 
much formal authority.  
If capacity should be conceptualized and measured separately from authority, this leads 
us to ask how different levels of capacity might shape the struggle between community and 
scale upon which Hooghe and Marks are focused. We tend to think of capacity as a “stickier” 
variable than authority; whereas the latter can be changed from one day to the next, the 
former typically accrues more slowly and incrementally. Could greater attention to capacity 
help account for some of the cross-national patterns that are illuminated by the regional 
authority index?  Perceptions of regional capacity likely shape the struggles over regional 
authority that are taking place today, and in a number of ways. Just to name two, deficient 
capacity may make it far less threatening for the center to formally devolve authority if it is 
worried about how this authority may be used, just as subnational governments may resist the 
transfer of authority if deficient capacity would likely prevent them from successfully 
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responding to demands from constituents that they actually put this authority to specific uses. 
In Latin America, to name one world region where the authority of subnational regions has 
experienced substantial volatility, one could argue that the decentralization of authority in the 
1980s brought into relief widespread problems of insufficient subnational capacity in ways that 
have more recently fueled the recentralization of authority. To state this question more 
broadly, how much conceptual distance should there be between authority and capacity?  
Another question has to do with the authors’ theoretical framework and the tension 
between “community” and “scale” as it plays out in the political arena. One intriguing empirical 
pattern identified by Hooghe and Marks is that scale (i.e. efficiency) designs are often 
implemented in the aftermath of political discontinuity, defined as exceptional moments when 
the number of veto players shrinks and designers suddenly enjoy much more freedom to 
redistribute authority between territorial units according to orderly, efficiency-enhancing, top-
down designs. In contrast, community-centered designs tend to emerge in a more path 
dependent fashion as local communities accumulate and use their power to demand authority 
successfully, but unevenly, from below. To some extent, then, the struggle between 
“community” and “scale” takes place as the conflict between rival logics – the former bottom-
up and the latter top-down. One reaction here is that it is clearer why the bottom-up logic 
would generate community-based designs than that the top-down logic would produce 
efficiency-based designs. While efficiency-based designs may well depend on political 
discontinuity, it may not make sense to assume that state elites at the top, if given their 
druthers, will necessarily prioritize scale or efficiency considerations over other considerations, 
including tenure security, political support, or geopolitical dynamics in borderland regions. The 
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assumption that technocrats will prefer scale designs seems safer than that politicians or top 
government officials or elected officials will prefer scale designs when given the chance. It 
seems that we would want to bring politics more directly into the dynamics of top-down reform 
dynamics rather than anticipate that considerations of scale will dominate these dynamics. 
Simply put, the political logic of the push from below in the direction of “community” is clearer 
than the political logic of the push from above in the direction of “scale.” 
Just as we should likely broaden the set of motivations (beyond efficiency) that drive 
national politicians, it also makes sense to think as broadly as possible about the “polity 
preferences” of those international actors who seek to influence the design of regional 
authority within countries. At first blush, the conflicts between community and scale over the 
design of subnational regions that Hooghe and Marks describe may strike many readers as 
quintessentially domestic conflicts; from the perspective of Stein Rokkan or Charles Tilly, what 
could be more easily covered by sovereignty norms – or more politically sensitive – than 
decisions by national governments about whether and how they want to empower subnational 
regions? Increasingly, however, it might be important to relax the domestic parameters of the 
conflict between community and scale to think in a more sustained way about how 
international and transnational actors and forces line up, and take sides, in this conflict, 
particularly in the countries of the global south where external actors tend to exert a great deal 
of sway. Oftentimes it seems that these external actors mostly line up on the side of scale 
designs and that they are usually interested in advancing efficiency concerns, as is typically the 
case for international financial institutions and multilateral organizations. But one can also 
identify transnational networks and international NGOs that may be more likely to favor and 
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promote community-driven designs in the express attempt to empower subnational 
communities (especially where ethnic communities are concentrated territorially). One case in 
point would be the transnational environmental NGOs who support and defend the right to 
prior consultation on the part subnational communities in the hopes of forestalling 
contamination from extractive industries. We’ll have to wait for volumes 3 and 4 for the 
systematic treatment of international actors, organizations, and governance, but what’s 
exciting is that other scholars, animated by a host of substantive and normative concerns, can 
already pick up and deploy the eminently usable conceptual and theoretical framework that 
Hooghe and Marks have given us to study regional authority.   
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Scale Meets Community: Hooghe and Marks’ Theory of Multilevel 
Governance 
 
 
Jean-Paul Faguet 
 
 
Volume II of Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks’ ambitious series is a slim and elegant book. This is 
especially so in comparison to Volume 1, a book that is chunkily rich in methodology and data, 
and well worth its non-trivial weight. Volume 2, by contrast, is a mere 162 pages of text. But the 
insights it contains are remarkable. It is an analytical tour de force that will change how we 
think about governance across space for decades to come. 
Let me discuss first what I most like about this book. There is a great deal to like, so let 
me focus on those things I found most striking on my initial reading. First, this is an immensely – 
and yet effortlessly – learned piece of scholarship. It is the product of years of work and study, 
not just by its principal authors, but by a larger team of colleagues and graduate students who 
toiled with them to corral a vast trove of information, and then fashioned it into the novel and 
immensely useful Regional Authority Index dataset.  That done, they spent years analyzing the 
data in ways that eventually led to this book. 
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance is a rich contribution to theory. But it is one 
based on a deep and detailed knowledge of the political economy of subnational and 
supranational governance across all of the world’s regions. This expertise is remarkable not just 
for the breadth of countries covered – the scope is global – but also for the depth of knowledge 
within each country. Many of the world’s 190+ countries are geographically, socially, and 
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politically highly diverse. Much of political science skates over this diversity, focusing on 
national systems and national political characteristics. But as an increasing number of scholars 
have argued in recent years (Boone 2014, Diaz-Cayeros 2006, Eaton 2006, Faguet 2012, and 
Faguet and Pöschl 2015), this is a mistake insofar as it obscures the subnational tensions that 
often determined important national outcomes, beneath a façade of national homogeneity and 
the presumption of equilibrium in institutional design. Here, Hooghe and Marks take the 
opposite tack, plumbing the levels and dimensions of countries’ subnational diversity in an 
explicit attempt to understand where this diversity comes from, and how it affects subnational 
and national governance. 
The book displays this broad and deep knowledge in ways that are illuminating, lend 
weight to its arguments, and are interesting in and of themselves. And through all this 
learnedness it avoids becoming pedantic, even as the authors move seamlessly – often in the 
same sentence – from the political and administrative details of regional governments in the 
Andes, to municipalities in Europe, and then island administrations in Southeast Asia. The effect 
on the reader is informative, and even inspirational, as we watch the authors polish each piece 
of analysis carefully before adding it to their growing edifice. 
Secondly, the book deploys an interdisciplinary political economy approach. This is not 
only close to my own heart – though it is – but also strictly advantageous for the analysis of 
governance institutions in a social context. Over recent decades, our awareness of the power of 
institutions to affect a broad array of outcomes across the economy, social relations, and 
political systems has grown. As a result, the analysis of institutions and institutional change sits 
less and less comfortably within the confines of any single discipline. If the sources of 
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institutional change are multidisciplinary, and their effects are multidisciplinary, then their 
analysis – if it is to be coherent and complete – should be interdisciplinary. 
Hooghe and Marks’ work fits the bill. Their take on “political economy” here is a blend 
of public economics and political sociology. This combination is particularly well-suited to an 
analysis of public goods, scale economies, externalities, and informational asymmetries that is 
embedded in a broader social context of community and identity. The authors are clearly well-
versed in both fields, and their approach is gratifyingly unified, blending what are, in the end, 
two very different subfields into a supple, coherent analytical tool. 
Thirdly, the book is well and clearly written, even as the ideas expressed are both deep 
and powerful. It is a pleasure to read. This is not something that can be said of many academic 
books, and even fewer books of theory. It reads as finest liquor – centuries of thinking and a 
wealth of data distilled into a compact purity of form. I could go on, but Hooghe and Marks’ 
words are preferable. So let me instead quote two examples: 
What principles underpin governance? One must begin by asking which group of persons should 
form a jurisdiction. This is the Who Question: who should have the right to make collectively 
binding decisions? Only after persons are conceived as members of a group does it make sense 
to ask how that group should make decisions. Democracy does not provide an answer. The 
principles that underpin democracy say nothing about who the people are. Majority rule, yes, 
but a majority of which people? Minority rights, but in relation to which majority? Principles of 
democracy, justice, or individual rights do not tell one which groups of persons should exercise 
governance to achieve these goods.  The fundamental question of governance – the Who 
Question – is logically and ontologically prior to questions relating to how a group makes 
decisions or what those decisions are.  A theory of governance should, at a minimum, seek to 
16 
 
explain the territorial structure of authority: which groups at which scales have authority to 
make what kinds decisions? (p.5) 
And also, 
Providing individuals with the policies they want is not the same as giving them the authority to 
collectively determine those policies. Self-rule is the independent exercise of authority. So, 
individuals may demand self-rule even if the central government tailors public goods to their 
preferences. The reason for this takes one to the core of governance, the exercise of legitimate 
power. 
Power is a capacity unlike any other because it is the present means to obtain some 
future good (Hobbes 1651/2001). It is the potential to realize one’s will in the face of resistance. 
Unlike money, it is not depleted when it is spent. With what might a people exchange the power 
to make its laws? This is precisely why conflict over the allocation of authority can be so difficult 
to resolve. Power, and its legitimate expression, authority, are master goods that relieve the 
bearer from trusting in the promises of others. 
A theory of governance should explain the institutional frame – the structure of 
authority – in which policies for this community, rather than that community, are decided. 
Knowledge about policy preferences, no matter how precise, cannot explain preferences over 
which groups should have the right to exercise collective authority. Preferences over 
governance are shaped by group attachments as well as by policy preferences. (pp.16-17) 
This is clear, deep, beautiful prose. 
What does this book achieve? First, it provides a coherent theory of government at the 
intersection of public economics (public goods) and the sociality of jurisdictional design (how 
people feel and act with respect to their communities). This is a blend not just across 
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disciplines, but also hierarchical styles, combining the top-down analysis of public goods 
provision with the bottom up analysis of social groups as a function of identity. 
Some may choose to criticize work like this as “lacking originality”, pointing an accusing 
finger at elements of an interdisciplinary synthesis (e.g. community, identity) that were already 
well-known. Attacks of this nature inevitably miss the point. The novelty of interdisciplinary 
work lies in the synthesis, not its components. Like a new machine, a new model is valuable for 
what it can do, not what it is made of. "Lack of originality" is an easy line of attack. But there's a 
huge distance between a handful of insights that cross disciplinary lines, and the hard work of 
integrating these into a coherent, tractable conceptual apparatus that can be tested 
empirically. This is precisely what Hooghe and Marks have achieved. 
Second, the book restates the famous Oates decentralization theorem, which holds that 
governments should centralize where necessary, based on scale economies and externalities, 
and decentralize where possible.  But it does so in a more robust way, adding to Oates’ public 
goods criteria a crucial second dimension: sociality. 
Third, it synthesizes quantitative, large-N methods with qualitative, small-N analysis 
successfully. This gives the book both breadth and depth. Hooghe and Marks are able to plumb 
the nuanced causes of governance arrangements in particular municipalities and regions that 
are highly illustrative, and at the same time generalize about the causes and consequences of 
different governance arrangements across most of the countries of the world. This is no mean 
feat. 
Fourth, the deployment of these “Q2” tools allows the authors to probe the deep drivers 
of decentralization/multilevel governance, rather than treating these phenomena as black 
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holes – institutional givens in particular places at particular times, whose effects may be 
analyzed, but whose provenance is unknown. Placing decentralization and multilevel 
governance at the center of the frame is an intellectual exercise at least as important as 
studying their effects, and often a more fertile one. 
Fifth, their concept of the Ladder of Governance sheds light on a striking regularity 
across countries, cultures, and regions of the world with a simple tool that is as elegant as it is 
far-reaching. Jurisdictional tiers, according to Hooghe and Marks, will be “arrayed at roughly 
equal intervals on an exponential population scale. The design will take the form of a Russian 
doll arrangement. The result is an elegant functional design which limits the number of 
jurisdictional levels, adjusts policy provision to scale diversity, and simplifies coordination by 
nesting each lower-level jurisdiction within a single jurisdiction at a higher level (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009).” (p.12) This gives shape to a rough intuition we all have, but which few of us 
previously understood. 
At the end of a tour de force that marries the hierarchical analysis of public goods 
provision with the political sociology of identity and community formation, where can we go 
next? Which questions do Hooghe and Marks leave unanswered? For any productive piece of 
research, the answer is many, of course. One that strikes me is that adding issues of political 
party structure, and in particular parties’ internal structures, to key characteristics of multilevel 
governance is likely to result in a fertile line of inquiry. 
The importance of the internal structures of political parties has been largely 
overlooked, but is hard to overstate. Consider a few of the exceptions. Ardanaz et al. (2014) 
show how internal pressures within Argentina’s political parties shaped both congressional 
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dynamics and fiscal policy, leading to Argentina’s macroeconomic disaster at the turn of the 
millennium. Myerson (2014) and Myerson et al. (2015) tie internal political party structure to 
the stability of institutional reform, including decentralization itself, and to political stability 
more generally. Faguet (2017a and 2017b) show how the move to multilevel governance in 
Bolivia fatally undermined a highly centralized political party system, populated by internally 
centralized parties. Decentralization facilitated the creation of new, regionally and locally-
specific parties and movements, undermining the national political party system, which 
disintegrated from the bottom up. 
These examples underline the larger point that politics affects governance, and 
governance affects politics. Each system operates simultaneously and continuously, at different 
levels of hierarchy and spatial aggregation. The study of how these parallel systems interact 
with one another, and their mutual effects on outcomes of interest that are further afield, such 
as corruption or economic growth, are areas where the application of Hooghe and Marks’ 
analytical framework are likely to reap rich rewards in future. Scholars who choose to go down 
this path will do well to mimic Hooghe and Marks’ methodological rigor, analytical style, and 
clarity of thought and expression. 
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Contributions of the Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance to 
Subnational Research in Comparative Politics1 
 
Imke Harbers 
 
Over the past two decades, the way scholars of comparative politics think about governance 
has undergone a profound transformation. While governance was previously conceived of 
primarily as the work of the central state – with fairly marginal or derivative roles for other 
levels of government – we now generally view the central state as just one actor in a system of 
governance that spans multiple tiers. Empirically, this transformation is underpinned by the 
realization that decentralization has strengthened the formal role of subnational actors, and 
that we therefore need to look beyond the central level to understand the process of 
governance.2 Research on the causes and consequences of decentralization and on subnational 
governance has matured considerably over the past two decades. Whereas an early generation 
of scholarship primarily envisioned benefits for the efficiency and effectiveness of public good 
provision, empirical research on the outcomes of decentralization reforms has found much 
more mixed results (e.g. Treisman, 2007). Scholars of comparative politics have therefore 
begun to examine the origins of this variance, and to probe the intervening variables that 
influence the outcomes of decentralized and multi-level governance. The two volumes at the 
                                                     
1 This work was supported by a Marie Curie Fellowship [Grant # 656361]. 
2 The forthcoming volume “Inside Countries: Subnational Research in Comparative Politics” edited by 
Agustina Giraudy, Eduardo Moncada and Richard Snyder, provides an insightful overview of 
different types of contemporary subnational research.  
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heart of this symposium constitute key contributions to this literature on decentralization and 
subnational governance. While the first volume “Measuring Regional Authority” (Hooghe et al., 
2016) offers a novel conceptualization and original data on the territorial structure of 
governance within countries, the second book “Community, Scale, and Regional Governance” 
(Hooghe, & Marks, 2016) theorizes this structure. It demonstrates the importance of 
community in determining governance, and provides a much-needed correction to functionalist 
accounts prioritizing scale. In this short commentary, I will highlight the conceptual 
contributions of this multi-volume project and the formulated postfunctionalist theory of 
governance to the subnational literature in comparative politics, and explain why geo-coding 
the Regional Authority Index (RAI) and taking a more explicitly spatial perspective could make 
the contribution even greater.  
 
“Scaling down”: A Fresh Perspective on the Territorial Structure of Governance  
Decentralization and the subsequent ‘subnational turn’ in comparative research have 
challenged comparativists to refine their conceptual toolbox, and to re-evaluate their approach 
to the study of governance. Following in the footsteps of many of the classics in comparative 
politics, countries had generally been understood as the “natural” unit of analysis in the study 
of politics, and the causes and consequences of cross-country variation in governance were 
assumed to be contained within them. This approach inspired the conceptualization of 
decentralized governance as a characteristic that national states possess to varying degrees. 
Measures of decentralization have thus looked from the top-down and defined decentralization 
as the opposite of centralized governance, more specifically as the amount of authority not 
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wielded by the central government. This, however, potentially conflates vastly different types 
of governance under one label. Vertically, it lumps together all subnational tiers and is 
therefore unable to speak to the relative importance of subnational tiers at different levels. 
Horizontally, such aggregate measures are insufficiently sensitive to within-country variation in 
the authority wielded by regions. Ultimately, studies drawing on these measures run the risk of 
constituting instances of what Snyder (2001) has described as “mean spirited analysis” in which 
the use of national measures conceals internal heterogeneity. Rather than providing a useful 
summary of the role of subnational jurisdictions in governance, national-level decentralization 
measures may then blur the distinction between very different types of subnational 
governance. From a measurement perspective, this is imprecise but it constitutes a problem 
only if there is empirical variation across countries in the way subnational governance is 
organized both vertically and horizontally.  
The Regional Authority Index – developed in the first of the two volumes – effectively 
pulls out the rug from under the approach of measuring decentralization as a national-level 
variable. It demonstrates not only that there is significant variation in the structure of 
subnational governance – both along the vertical and the horizontal axis – but it also 
demonstrates that this diversity has increased over time. The RAI is novel in that it measures 
authority directly at the level of subnational jurisdictions. With regard to the vertical division of 
authority between regional tiers, the RAI shows that an increasing number of countries have 
more than one regional tier between the local and the national level of government, and that 
the relative authority of different tiers changes over time (Hooghe, & Marks, 2016, Chapter 3). 
Such changes are not picked up by national-level measures of decentralization, even though 
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they may constitute significant changes in the territorial structure of governance. At the 
horizontal level, there is a persistent shift away from uniform frameworks that treat all 
jurisdictions within a country equally towards differentiated governance, in which the 
authoritative competences of some regions differ from those of others in the same country. 
‘Uniform governance has become the exception rather than the rule’ (Hooghe, & Marks, 2016, 
17-8), as the analysis of empirical trends in the RAI shows. 
For the literature on decentralization and subnational governance, these findings have 
two important implications. First, they provide some pointers as to why previous studies have 
found contradictory results for the outcomes of decentralization reforms. Decentralization, 
measured as the absence of centralized governance, is simply too blunt a tool to adequately 
capture different types of governance arrangements. The question is thus not so much whether 
decentralization leads to more efficient public good provision, but which types of governance 
may have the desired effects.  
Second, for the broader literature in comparative politics, these findings highlight why 
conceiving of states as primary units of analysis has become less appropriate over time. A 
measure, as Hooghe et al. (2016, 3) point out, ‘is a disciplined summary. It attaches conceptual 
relevance to some phenomena and ignores others.’ When most countries had just one regional 
tier and uniform authority across regions, the analytic costs of measuring decentralization at 
the national level were fairly minimal. As subnational jurisdictions have come to wield more 
authority, however, and do so within differentiated frameworks, privileging the national level 
creates blind spots that are hard to justify and analytically costly. By making new data available 
at the regional level, the RAI enables scholars to refine their analysis and move forward.  
26 
 
Interdependence in overlapping systems  
Another piece of heritage that the comparative politics literature has taken from the classics in 
the field is the notion that the causes and consequences of the phenomena we care about are 
contained within well-bounded units, traditionally countries. These units are then assumed to 
be independent from one another, so that scholars can select one (or more) for analysis of a 
causal process of interest. When subnational units, rather than whole countries, are the units of 
analysis, this assumption of unit-independence comes under pressure. Subnational boundaries 
are arguable more permeable than national borders, and units within a country are exposed to 
common influences from the national level. Subnational units are therefore embedded both 
vertically and horizontally. Relaxing the assumption of unit independence, however, requires 
expanding the canon of comparative politics to include methodological approaches better 
suited to the analysis of interdependence. Because many of the founders of the field focused 
on interactions within well-bounded systems (e.g. Sartori 1976/2005), the analysis of 
interactions between and across multiple systems – either horizontally or vertically – has 
remained a challenge for comparativists.3  
In examining the division of territories into jurisdictions, Hooghe and Marks (2016) 
contribute to shifting the focus of comparative politics from dynamics within well-bounded 
systems to interdependence among multiple overlapping systems. Interestingly, they draw 
inspiration from the work of Stein Rokkan (1970), one of the founding fathers of the field of 
comparative politics. His work on modernization and state building sought to understand the 
                                                     
3 For a more in-depth discussion of how to incorporate spatial dependence in comparative methodology 
see Giraudy et al. (forthcoming), Harbers and Ingram (2017a) and Harbers and Ingram (2017b).   
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creation of national political systems from dispersed local communities, and the very creation 
of boundedness within countries. While Rokkan’s work examined how communities were 
initially integrated into states and which factors favored integration, Hooghe and Marks explore 
how distinct communities have survived in the face of homogenizing pressure from the center. 
They highlight the footprint of historical communities in contemporary governance and the role 
of community in creating pressure for differentiated governance. 
Interdependence enters their analysis in multiple ways. For one, the analysis seeks to 
uncover the factors that allow minority territorial communities to maintain distinct identities 
even in the face of homogenizing pressures from a central state. Their conceptualization of 
community emphasizes dense interactions within the community, contrasted with less intense 
interactions between the community and outsiders. A community is best able to survive when 
it is geographically isolated: ‘the greater the time and effort required for communication 
between a core and a periphery, the weaker the pressure of homogenization’ (Hooghe, & 
Marks, 2016, 20). Communities at the margin of the territory can therefore resist 
homogenization even when they are fairly small. Communities in closer proximity to the center 
need to be populous and large in order to avoid assimilation, because size ‘increases interaction 
within the region as a proportion of all interaction’ (Hooghe, & Marks, 2016, 22). Hooghe and 
Marks do not just ‘scale down’, however, and replace countries with regions as building blocks 
of analysis, they also scale back up and identify how the formal empowerment of some 
communities reverberates throughout other communities in the country. The recognition of 
some communities may spark demands for empowerment, and thus pressure for regional 
authority, in others, leaving a broader imprint on the structure of governance.  
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Conceptually, this book contributes significantly to the study of comparative politics by 
proposing and in some instances rediscovering ways to think about interdependence. Hooghe 
and Marks’ engagement with some of the classics in the field – chiefly Stein Rokkan and Karl 
Deutsch – serves to remind comparativists that boundaries and boundedness were not always 
taken for granted, and that their emergence and the extent to which they delimit political 
processes has and should be a core focus of the field. Moreover, while Rokkan had strong 
intuitions about how the intensity of interaction between local communities and the national 
state came to transform politics in the process of state building, he lacked the empirical and 
analytical tools to effectively test his intuitions. Recently, the development of Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) and new techniques for the analysis of spatial data has provided 
scholars with new techniques to analyze spatial dependence. Rather than assume 
independence among units, these techniques investigate the existence and nature of 
interdependence.4 To access these techniques, data must be geo-coded so that non-spatial 
data are associated with physical locations.  A crucial and timely way to push forward the study 
of interdependence in comparative politics would therefore be to geo-code the Regional 
Authority Index.  
For one, geo-coding would allow for a more explicit test of some of the spatial concepts 
contained in the postfunctionalist theory of governance. Notions of distance, remoteness, and 
connectedness are well theorized and operationalized in spatial analysis. Hooghe and Marks 
(2016) now operationalize ‘distance’ as a binary variable, and a jurisdiction is coded as 
                                                     
4
 Darmofal (2015) offers an informative and accessible introduction to spatial analysis in the social 
sciences.  
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geographically peripheral if ‘it is an island or non-contiguous territory that is 30km or more 
distant from the mainland of its state’ (Hooghe, & Marks, 2016, 130-1). The implication of the 
theory is more continuous, however, as distance seeks to capture the ‘geographical barriers 
that impede political, economic, and cultural interaction and which sustain cultural 
distinctiveness even in the face of a prolonged state strategy to assimilate’ (Hooghe, & Marks 
2016, 73). Only coding non-contiguous islands as remote therefore constitutes are very 
conservative test of the theory. An alternative operationalization might be travel-time to the 
closest population center in which the majority language is spoken, a variable that can fairly 
easily be calculated with GIS software. 
Geo-coding the RAI would also make it possible to take the analysis one step further. 
Since there is an empirical trend towards more regionalized and more differentiated 
governance over time, one might suspect that the recognition of the distinctiveness of specific 
communities generates pressures not just within countries, but also across countries. The 
formation of states often divided linguistic and cultural communities. Where minority territorial 
communities share a language and culture with a group in a neighboring country, the 
empowerment of the community in one country might spark similar demands across the 
border. The recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to self-rule during the 1990s, for instance, 
begs the question of whether the recognition of a community in a given country increases the 
importance of community in the territorial structure of governance in nearby countries.   
While geo-coding the RAI would thus make it possible to expand the analysis and examine 
additional implications of the postfunctionalist theory, it is also worth emphasizing that such a 
dataset would be a tremendous service to the field and to the burgeoning literature on multi-
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level and decentralized governance. Hooghe et al.’s ambition is to ‘make it possible for 
researchers to investigate the causal links between the structure of government and its causes 
and consequences’ (2016, 21). In many cases, however, variables on causes and consequences 
may not be available at the level of contemporary general-purpose jurisdictions. This could be 
because a phenomenon of interest does not map onto subnational jurisdictions (Harbers, & 
Ingram, forthcoming). It could also be because data are not collected for all subnational tiers. 
Moreover, one of the key findings of the two volumes is that the territorial structure of 
governance within countries is not static over time, as tiers are created, consolidated and 
boundaries re-drawn to accommodate changing pressures of community and scale. In addition, 
Hooghe and Marks show that discontinuity at the central level, for instance in the aftermath of 
a revolution, decolonization or regime change, is a likely trigger for reforms in the structure of 
regional governance as incoming central rulers seek to impose their vision on the country. This 
dynamism is a challenge for subnational research, because new and old units often do not line 
up in a spreadsheet (Lankina, 2012). They do, however, overlap in space. Geo-coding then 
makes it possible to match units over time by identifying ‘common geographies’ (Slez et al., 
2017).  
In suggesting geo-coding the RAI, let me be clear in acknowledging that there are 
excellent reasons for being reluctant to embark on such an endeavor. While international 
borders tend to be fairly stable over time, subnational jurisdictional boundaries – as discussed 
above – are much more dynamic. There is, to the best of my knowledge, no comprehensive 
geo-spatial dataset of subnational jurisdictions containing all subnational tiers, and tracing 
boundary changes on an annual basis. Geo-coding the RAI would therefore require compiling 
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such a database, most likely by obtaining geo-spatial data from country-level sources. The 
magnitude of data gathering required may therefore seem daunting. However, the team 
behind the RAI has already demonstrated their ability to bring an ambitious data project to a 
successful conclusion. Since research at the subnational level as well as on interdependence in 
overlapping systems is likely to occupy the field of comparative politics for years to come, a 
geo-coded RAI would be an invaluable resource.  
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Virtues and Pitfalls of Subnational Comparison  
Arjan H. Schakel, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sandra 
Chapman-Osterkatz, and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield 
 
Kent Eaton, Jean-Paul Faguet, and Imke Harbers positively review our two volumes, but they 
also raise critical issues. First, Kent Eaton introduces the concept of state capacity in relation to 
formal authority, and suggests that formal authority may be neither necessary nor sufficient for 
the exercise of subnational authority. Second, Jean-Paul Faguet suggests that a 
postfunctionalist theory of multilevel governance would benefit from engaging political parties, 
and in particular parties’ internal organization. Third, Imke Harbers argues that a chief virtue of 
a multilevel governance perspective is that it problematizes the interdependence among levels 
and units rather than assuming that each system is a world in itself, and she proposes to geo-
code the Regional Authority Index (RAI) to capture inter- and intra-state spatial dependencies.  
An inherent challenge in political measurement is to strike a balance “between a 
universalizing tendency, which is inattentive to contextual differences, and a particularizing 
approach, which is skeptical about the feasibility of constructing measures that transcend 
specific contexts” (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 530; Sartori, 1970). This raises the question of the 
limitations of the RAI. Are there contextual differences that render the measure more or less 
valid? These questions are pertinent as our team is preparing to update the RAI and extend its 
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coverage to less developed societies.5 Eaton takes up this issue by suggesting that authority and 
capacity are different. In his recent book on subnational governance in Peru, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador, Eaton (2017, p. 19) argues that “it is important not to overstate the significance of 
formal decentralization because the reality is that subnational elected officials … often enjoy 
significant de facto autonomy to act on their ideological preferences. … I find that capacity is a 
more critical factor than subnational authority in explaining when subnational officials can act 
on their discordant preferences.”  
Eaton (2017, pp. 41-3, 179-181) makes a persuasive case that to explain variation in the 
exercise of subnational authority to challenge national economic regimes one must engage the 
institutional capacity (e.g. the independence of the regional administration, its resources, 
cohesion, and freedom from corruption), alongside economic power and coalitional behavior. 
Having a clean measure of formal subnational authority—the extent to which regional 
governments are legally empowered to tax, spend, and make policy (the RAI measures legal 
                                                     
5 The RAI dataset spans individual regions and regional tiers in 81 countries between 1950 and 2010 (see 
Hooghe et al., 2016; http://garymarks.web.unc.edu). This project was funded by an Advanced European 
Research Council Grant #249543 and by a European Commission grant #2655307. An update for 43 
European and OECD countries to 2016, funded by a grant from the European Commission, will be 
released in Fall 2018,  (#2016.CE.16.BAT.079; Schakel, Danailova, Gein, & Hegewald, forthcoming). We 
are expanding the dataset to ten additional Asian countries (Shair-Rosenfield, forthcoming), the Ukraine, 
India, and China. These extensions and updates are funded by a research fund at Arizona State 
University, and the Kenan and Burton Craige research funds at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill. The release of a RAI dataset with scores updated through 2018 for all countries is planned for 2019.  
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authority across ten dimensions)—can be useful for precisely testing this alternative 
hypothesis. It helps the analyst assess rival causal claims that may otherwise be difficult to 
disentangle. Formal authority is but one ingredient in how authority is actually exercised, so it is 
all the more important to have measures of the key variables that do not contaminate each 
other.  
The challenge of doing this varies across context. Ring fencing formal-legal authority is 
simpler in stable democracies than in countries that experience authoritarian rule or lack a 
robust tradition of the rule of law. In such cases, it may be tempting to stretch the 
operationalization of legal authority to include more of what shapes its exercise. There is no 
silver bullet, and our guiding principle is to make our conceptual, operational, and coding 
decisions transparent. When the RAI expanded to Asia and Latin America, we knew we needed 
to develop explicit guidelines for situations where state capacity or informal norms might 
undercut provisions codified in law. One rule was to require evidence that a reform of 
subnational authority was actually implemented. If, for example, the constitution states that 
regional governments may tax their population, but there is no enabling law, we do not code 
regions as having fiscal authority. Similarly, we date a reform when it comes into effect, not 
when it is proscribed in legislation (Hooghe et al., 2016, pp. 20-21; Shair-Rosenfield, Marks & 
Hooghe, 2014). At the same time, the RAI estimates authority independently from regime type 
so it is possible to assess how the imposition of a military regime, for example, affects each of 
the ten dimensions (Niedzwiecki, Chapman Osterkatz, Hooghe & Marks, forthcoming). If law 
matters less in some societies, the RAI might be useful in figuring out why and how.  
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Incidentally, capacity combined with formal authority may not translate into exercised 
authority. The Scottish government has had the legal authority and state capacity to set the 
rate of income tax, but has so far not exercised this right, reportedly out of concern that regime 
competition with lower tax rates in the rest of the United Kingdom would induce Scottish 
taxpayers to switch tax residence to England.6 To rephrase in Boolean language: authority and 
capacity are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the exercise of authority. Mobilization 
of authority or capacity is also a necessary pre-condition. The impact of authority and capacity 
may be best conceived as conditional rather than direct.7  
A core theoretical puzzle is to specify the relative role of these factors across contexts. 
This is an exciting playing field for research. Whichever theoretical road one takes, formal 
authority stands as a post in the sand: a phenomenon to explain, a reference against which to 
contrast executed authority, a control. The upshot is that it seems to make sense to begin by 
conceiving and estimating formal authority as distinct. 
Jean-Paul Faguet highlights the mediating role of political parties in shaping regional 
authority. Riker (1964, p. 129) famously claimed that “The federal relationship is centralized 
                                                     
6 Michael Gray, Business for Scotland, ‘Explaining the limited tax powers in the Scotland Act 2012’. 
http://www.businessforscotland.com/explaining-the-limited-tax-powers-in-the-scotland-act-2012/ and 
Alexander Garden and David Welsh of Turcan Connell, Lyon and Turnbull, ‘Scottish Devolved Taxation – 
Where Are We Now?’ https://www.lyonandturnbull.com/scottish-devolved-taxation-where-are-we-now 
(consulted on 17 September 2017). 
7 If this is true, it may signify that the best use of the RAI is in interaction with variables whose causal 
relationship it conditions.  
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according to the degree to which the parties organized to operate the central government 
control the parties organized to operate the constituent units,” but recent research suggests 
that the relationship is reciprocal. Political parties are both consumers and producers of 
regional authority, and the interplay between how parties are organized internally and how the 
state is structured requires careful modeling (Faguet, 2017; see also Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; 
Harbers, 2010). Faguet shows compellingly how, in Bolivia, initial decentralization allowed Evo 
Morales’ decentralized movement to outmanoeuvre the traditional parties, but how, in a 
second round, activists in the now decentralized parties drove Morales to concede deeper 
decentralization (Faguet, 2017). This reciprocal relationship reinforces the argument for 
minimalism—the effort to avoid contaminating a measure by including too much.  
Postfunctionalist theory is oriented to the politics of jurisdictional design (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2009; Schakel, 2009), so we need to respond to Faguet’s gentle query of why we “leave 
unanswered” this “fertile line of inquiry.” The aim in Volume II is to consider the causal power 
of distal factors—having to do with geography, language, and state building—for patterns of 
regional authority that we see today. This, as Faguet suggests, is a sociological theory. We are 
keenly aware that these factors do not operate directly, but must be interpreted, mobilized, 
and mediated by political actors and that the closer one examines a particular outcome, the 
more one must engage actors, institutions, and preferences. Nonetheless, it seems to be the 
case that patterns of human settlement, language use, and histories of political independence 
leave a distinct and detectable footprint on contemporary multilevel governance (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2016, p. 147).  
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Several novel strands of research model the interplay between political parties and 
regional authority. One line of inquiry examines the effects of regional party strength (Brancati, 
2008; Massetti & Schakel, 2013, 2017; Meguid, 2015). Another is the relationship between 
decentralization and the internal party structure of state-wide parties (Faguet, in this issue; 
Harbers, 2010; Fabre & Swenden, 2013). A third is to take into account elite preferences and 
elite interaction (Niedzwiecki, 2016; Shair-Rosenfield, 2016; Tatham & Bauer, 2014).  
Imke Harbers reminds us that spatial dependence is integral to multilevel governance, 
and this has important methodological implications. For one, it requires clarity in the definition 
of territorial space. The RAI is concerned with authority that in most cases is spatially defined 
by regional administrative units. However, it also encompasses the spatial organizations of 
indigenous peoples in Latin America, North America, and Asia. These challenge the Euro-centric 
notion of an ethnic group that is a national minority but a territorial majority in some 
jurisdiction with fixed borders. At the same time, we did not wish to include governance 
arrangements for non-territorial groups in a society. Our solution was to include groups with a 
territorial “homeland” and to exclude autonomy arrangements for groups without a territorially 
defined jurisdiction. 
We welcome Imke Harbers’ suggestion to geo-code the RAI so that its observations can 
be located in physical space. Geo-coding the RAI would involve the construction of a 
comprehensive geo-spatial dataset containing all subnational jurisdictions at every subnational 
tier, and tracking boundary changes on an annual basis. This could then be merged into a super-
dataset with data collected by scholars and statistical offices following the territorial 
boundaries of subnational institutions as they change over time, including datasets of election 
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results, the party composition of regional executives, socio-economic data, and public revenues 
and expenditures.  
The possibilities associated with geo-referenced RAI data are numerous (Harbers & 
Ingram, 2017). Geo-referenced data could help address research questions on within-
subnational unit variation in policy outcomes. For example, researchers in public 
administration, public health, or development may want to investigate whether the level of 
regional authority or the kind of authority (e.g. extent of self-rule, or extent or type of tax 
autonomy) is associated with better social policy outcomes, such as access to immunizations or 
literacy. Or they could examine the effect of terrain and distance on state capacity while 
controlling for authority. This would permit assessments of whether infrastructural deficiencies 
interfere with authority as it is exercised further away from the center (e.g. Shair-Rosenfield, 
2017). 
Spatial dependence makes it so much more plausible that diffusion—the process 
whereby units are affected by what takes place in other units—shapes outcomes (Harbers & 
Ingram, 2017). Competition or convergence may generate diffusion, but in either case, the 
assumption of unit independence is violated. Using geo-coded electoral support data for the 
2012 election in Mexico, Harbers demonstrates that party support in one district increases the 
likelihood of party support in a nearby district, thus highlighting the importance of location in 
the dynamics of party nationalization (Harbers, 2017). Diffusion is an implicit recurrent theme 
in Volume II and comes into play given our finding that demand for self-rule on the part of a 
minority community affects the society as a whole. Diffusion may operate at the subnational 
level across national borders particularly when, as Harbers notes, a minority community shares 
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a language and culture with one in a neighboring country. Moving beyond “methodological 
nationalism” is a task that transcends replacing countries as a natural unit of analysis by units of 
varying territorial scales (Giraudy, Moncada & Snyder, 2017); it requires systematic data 
collection and out-of-the-box thinking about the multiple scales at which interdependence 
takes place (Jeffery & Wincott, 2010).  
Through all of this, the virtue of extending comparison across scale, within and among 
states, stands out. By controlling for national factors, subnational comparison can gain levers of 
inference and theory building. Moreover, the causal factors that produce variation among 
states may not mirror those among units within states. Most states encompass a diversity of 
territorially distinct institutions and patterns of behavior. Each of the factors discussed in this 
essay, including legal authority, institutional capacity, political parties, geography, language, 
and state building vary within states, and the effort to generalize about such phenomena is an 
exciting frontier of comparative politics.  
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